Αrt2589 Σαββατο 4 Μαρτίου 2017
TΟ ΔΟΓΜΑ ΤΟΥ ΥΒΡΙΔΙΚΟΥ/ΜΗ ΓΡΑΜΜΙΚΟΥ ΠΟΛΕΜΟΥ ΤΟΥ ΣΤΡΑΤΗΓΟΥ ΓΚΕΡΑΣΙΜΩΦ/ΕΠΙΡΡΟΗ ΑΠΟ ΣΥΓΧΡΟΝΗ ΚΙΝΕΖΙΚΗ ΣΤΡΑΤΙΩΤΙΚΗ ΣΚΕΨΗ/Градація Герасимова: Оцінка російської нелінійної війни за допомогою сучасної китайської доктрини
Posted by Fighting For Truth
Grading Gerasimov: Evaluating Russian Nonlinear War Through Modern Chinese Doctrine
V. Morris
“Wars are not declared, and having begun, proceed to an unfamiliar template,” stated General Valery Gerasimov, the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, during a closed speech at the Russian Academy of Military Sciences. The primary topic of this speech was “The Role of the General Staff in the Organization of the Defense of the Country in Correspondence with the New Statute about the General Staff Confirmed by the President of the Russian Federation.”
This speech given in late 2013 was crucial because it enumerated and elucidated the strategies that would develop Russian nonlinear military doctrine in 2014, which is known as “Gerasimov Doctrine”. Russian Foreign Policy Reviews, State Security Strategies and “Gerasimov Doctrine” combined with Russian political views codify nonlinear war as the emergence of a new kind of war. This new form of warfare is facilitated by 21st century technologies and multiple actors employing combinations of conventional and unconventional instruments. In short, “the very rules of war have been fundamentally changed” and, according to General Gerasimov, non-military means have surpassed the power of force to achieve strategic and political goals. The current situation in Ukraine and, to some extent in neighboring former Soviet republics (primarily Baltic States), highlights the application of nonlinear war.
Is it working?
In order to adequately assess current and future threats to European security and the methods to counter such threats, this article intends to “grade”, or evaluates, specific applications of nonlinear war in Ukraine based on Chinese military doctrine, geopolitical strategies and conflicts in Europe.
Russia’s Road to Nonlinear War: Cold War, 1979-Present
Unrestricted war is a war that surpasses all boundaries and restrictions. It takes nonmilitary forms and military forms and creates a war on many fronts. It is the war of the future.
-Colonel Qiao Liang and Colonel Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted War, Beijing, 1998
“Gerasimov Doctrine” contains particular similarities to the Chinese doctrine outlined in Unrestricted Warfare published in 1999, and historical roots in previous Russian doctrine. Both strategies involve using proxies, or surrogates, to not only exploit vulnerabilities in low intensity conflict, but to also prepare for future operations, which may involve high intensity conflict. Other strategies involve applying both low and high tech asymmetrical means, and also engaging in several forms of war. For example, Unrestricted Warfare describes 13 forms of “total war” and methods to consciously mix “cocktails” on the battlefield, or to employ combinations of forms of warfare in order to find innovative and effective approaches. In Ukraine, the notion of consciously “mixing cocktails” to produce effective nonlinear strategies highlights the unpredictable effects that these tactics may have on the organs of government. Regardless of the particular nonlinear strategies applied, destabilization and exploitation of vulnerabilities are the results. Therefore, the assessment tool for this article is the effective application of warfare combinations in four categories to reach specific long-term political outcomes.
In continuing to approach this assessment within an academic metaphor, this article imagines Russia as a student. Russia has studied nonlinear war since the Cold War (called Active Measures) and Afghanistan through the 1980s, and continued these studies with interventions in Moldova and Lithuania in the early 1990s. Furthermore, from 1994 to 2009, Russia double majored in nonlinear war during the First and Second Chechen Wars. While completing Undergraduate degrees, Russia entered the workforce by engaging Georgia with espionage in 2006, conducting cyber attacks against Estonia in 2007, and completing “counterterrorism” campaigns in Chechnya in 2009. The Russo-Georgian War in 2008, however, is an exemplary case first, of the evolution of nonlinear or hybrid capabilities; secondly, of the application of indirect instruments in order to destabilize a country; and thirdly, of the volatile effects of such tactics that persist until today. Moreover, during and after this conflict, Russian tactics also combined cyber warfare with both informational and conventional means. Currently, through the lens of this article’s academic metaphor, Russia is further developing its nonlinear war practices by pursuing a Master’s Degree in Ukraine. This program involves subjects like gaining and maintaining popular support, military mobilization, refinement of nonlinear approaches to war and preparation for future unconventional conflicts.
21st Century Warfare
What we see in Russia now in this hybrid approach to war, is the use of all the tools that they have to reach into a nation and cause instability.
-General Philip M. Breedlove, Munich Security Report 2015
“New generation, ambiguous, hybrid, nonlinear, unrestricted, irregular, unconventional and asymmetric” are all terms associated with 21st century warfare. Warfare is typically defined in two general forms: Traditional and Irregular, where the latter can apply hybrid threat strategies to reach mutual benefitting effects. Irregular Warfare is defined as a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. Irregular Warfare favors indirect approaches and asymmetric means. A central component of Irregular Warfare is unconventional warfare, which employs “activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerilla force in a denied area”. Another definition of Irregular Warfare outlines the achievement of “strategic objectives by avoiding an adversary’s conventional military strength while eroding an adversary’s power and will, primarily through the use of indirect, non-traditional aspects of warfare.” The former application of unconventional warfare relies on external parties aiding indigenous actors against governments. Some examples of aid involve training, equipping, advising and employing kinetic action to seize terrain or increase the advantage of irregular forces. The term “irregular forces” refers to State and non-State military or paramilitary forces. Nonlinear warfare directly or indirectly employs non-military and military instruments through the following means: diplomats, intelligence agencies, professional soldiers, special operations forces, insurgents, guerillas, extremist groups, mercenaries and criminals.
Contemporary hybrid warfare, hybrid threat and hybrid aggression have all been used to describe potent and complex variations of warfare in the 21st century. Although this type of warfare is not new, contemporary threat actors are redefining the application by employing 21st century technologies and combinations of diplomatic, intelligence formation, militaristic, economic and humanitarian means, and in various domains to include cyberspace. What further complicates this form of warfare is the persistent fluctuation and manipulation of political, informational and ideological conflict– key aspects of hybrid warfare which extend past traditional coercive diplomacy and unconventional war. This article utilizes the term “nonlinear war” in the same way as defined by Russian military doctrine: as a means to reach desired strategic orientation and geopolitical outcomes primarily using non-military approaches.
Making the Grade
Today’s wars will affect the price of gasoline in pipelines, the price of food in supermarkets, and the price of securities on the stock exchange. They will also disrupt the ecological balance and push their way into every one of our homes by way of the television screen
-Alvin Toffler
As previously outlined, the grading process considers the effectiveness of warfare combinations and their ability to reach their intended outcomes. In the case of Ukraine, probable intended outcomes are summarized first, as destabilizing both the region specifically and the European Union as a whole and secondly as preventing NATO military infrastructure near Russian borders, and thirdly as preventing NATO membership expansion. Political ideology involving Eurasianism and dividing the west are also possible objectives. The following assessments are based on how well the Russian Federation conducts various operations in conflicts with regard to four combination categories as outlined in Chinese unrestricted warfare doctrine: supra-national, supra-domain, supra-means and supra-tier.
Supra-national Combinations are a synthesis of national, international and non-state organizations. In the 21st century, global powers must borrow multinational and non-state powers in order to expand their own influence. One of the most recent examples of this combination involves the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and its competition with Ukrainian European integration, which eventually led to the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution. This union operates through supranational and intergovernmental institutions which include a mutual defense alliance. Possible Russian objectives for the EEU involve growth into a powerful, supra-national union of sovereign states analogous to the European Union in order to form a unilaterally beneficial bridge between Europe and Asia. Intermediate competitive objectives may involve enlarging the Customs Union to post soviet states, which could eventually involve breakaway regions of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine whose parent countries have already signed association agreements with the European Union. Ukraine is strategically important because it has the second largest economy of any of the 15 former republics of the Soviet Union.
TΟ ΔΟΓΜΑ ΤΟΥ ΥΒΡΙΔΙΚΟΥ/ΜΗ ΓΡΑΜΜΙΚΟΥ ΠΟΛΕΜΟΥ ΤΟΥ ΣΤΡΑΤΗΓΟΥ ΓΚΕΡΑΣΙΜΩΦ/ΕΠΙΡΡΟΗ ΑΠΟ ΣΥΓΧΡΟΝΗ ΚΙΝΕΖΙΚΗ ΣΤΡΑΤΙΩΤΙΚΗ ΣΚΕΨΗ/Градація Герасимова: Оцінка російської нелінійної війни за допомогою сучасної китайської доктрини
Posted by Fighting For Truth
Grading Gerasimov: Evaluating Russian Nonlinear War Through Modern Chinese Doctrine
V. Morris
“Wars are not declared, and having begun, proceed to an unfamiliar template,” stated General Valery Gerasimov, the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, during a closed speech at the Russian Academy of Military Sciences. The primary topic of this speech was “The Role of the General Staff in the Organization of the Defense of the Country in Correspondence with the New Statute about the General Staff Confirmed by the President of the Russian Federation.”
This speech given in late 2013 was crucial because it enumerated and elucidated the strategies that would develop Russian nonlinear military doctrine in 2014, which is known as “Gerasimov Doctrine”. Russian Foreign Policy Reviews, State Security Strategies and “Gerasimov Doctrine” combined with Russian political views codify nonlinear war as the emergence of a new kind of war. This new form of warfare is facilitated by 21st century technologies and multiple actors employing combinations of conventional and unconventional instruments. In short, “the very rules of war have been fundamentally changed” and, according to General Gerasimov, non-military means have surpassed the power of force to achieve strategic and political goals. The current situation in Ukraine and, to some extent in neighboring former Soviet republics (primarily Baltic States), highlights the application of nonlinear war.
Is it working?
In order to adequately assess current and future threats to European security and the methods to counter such threats, this article intends to “grade”, or evaluates, specific applications of nonlinear war in Ukraine based on Chinese military doctrine, geopolitical strategies and conflicts in Europe.
Russia’s Road to Nonlinear War: Cold War, 1979-Present
Unrestricted war is a war that surpasses all boundaries and restrictions. It takes nonmilitary forms and military forms and creates a war on many fronts. It is the war of the future.
-Colonel Qiao Liang and Colonel Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted War, Beijing, 1998
“Gerasimov Doctrine” contains particular similarities to the Chinese doctrine outlined in Unrestricted Warfare published in 1999, and historical roots in previous Russian doctrine. Both strategies involve using proxies, or surrogates, to not only exploit vulnerabilities in low intensity conflict, but to also prepare for future operations, which may involve high intensity conflict. Other strategies involve applying both low and high tech asymmetrical means, and also engaging in several forms of war. For example, Unrestricted Warfare describes 13 forms of “total war” and methods to consciously mix “cocktails” on the battlefield, or to employ combinations of forms of warfare in order to find innovative and effective approaches. In Ukraine, the notion of consciously “mixing cocktails” to produce effective nonlinear strategies highlights the unpredictable effects that these tactics may have on the organs of government. Regardless of the particular nonlinear strategies applied, destabilization and exploitation of vulnerabilities are the results. Therefore, the assessment tool for this article is the effective application of warfare combinations in four categories to reach specific long-term political outcomes.
In continuing to approach this assessment within an academic metaphor, this article imagines Russia as a student. Russia has studied nonlinear war since the Cold War (called Active Measures) and Afghanistan through the 1980s, and continued these studies with interventions in Moldova and Lithuania in the early 1990s. Furthermore, from 1994 to 2009, Russia double majored in nonlinear war during the First and Second Chechen Wars. While completing Undergraduate degrees, Russia entered the workforce by engaging Georgia with espionage in 2006, conducting cyber attacks against Estonia in 2007, and completing “counterterrorism” campaigns in Chechnya in 2009. The Russo-Georgian War in 2008, however, is an exemplary case first, of the evolution of nonlinear or hybrid capabilities; secondly, of the application of indirect instruments in order to destabilize a country; and thirdly, of the volatile effects of such tactics that persist until today. Moreover, during and after this conflict, Russian tactics also combined cyber warfare with both informational and conventional means. Currently, through the lens of this article’s academic metaphor, Russia is further developing its nonlinear war practices by pursuing a Master’s Degree in Ukraine. This program involves subjects like gaining and maintaining popular support, military mobilization, refinement of nonlinear approaches to war and preparation for future unconventional conflicts.
21st Century Warfare
What we see in Russia now in this hybrid approach to war, is the use of all the tools that they have to reach into a nation and cause instability.
-General Philip M. Breedlove, Munich Security Report 2015
“New generation, ambiguous, hybrid, nonlinear, unrestricted, irregular, unconventional and asymmetric” are all terms associated with 21st century warfare. Warfare is typically defined in two general forms: Traditional and Irregular, where the latter can apply hybrid threat strategies to reach mutual benefitting effects. Irregular Warfare is defined as a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. Irregular Warfare favors indirect approaches and asymmetric means. A central component of Irregular Warfare is unconventional warfare, which employs “activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerilla force in a denied area”. Another definition of Irregular Warfare outlines the achievement of “strategic objectives by avoiding an adversary’s conventional military strength while eroding an adversary’s power and will, primarily through the use of indirect, non-traditional aspects of warfare.” The former application of unconventional warfare relies on external parties aiding indigenous actors against governments. Some examples of aid involve training, equipping, advising and employing kinetic action to seize terrain or increase the advantage of irregular forces. The term “irregular forces” refers to State and non-State military or paramilitary forces. Nonlinear warfare directly or indirectly employs non-military and military instruments through the following means: diplomats, intelligence agencies, professional soldiers, special operations forces, insurgents, guerillas, extremist groups, mercenaries and criminals.
Contemporary hybrid warfare, hybrid threat and hybrid aggression have all been used to describe potent and complex variations of warfare in the 21st century. Although this type of warfare is not new, contemporary threat actors are redefining the application by employing 21st century technologies and combinations of diplomatic, intelligence formation, militaristic, economic and humanitarian means, and in various domains to include cyberspace. What further complicates this form of warfare is the persistent fluctuation and manipulation of political, informational and ideological conflict– key aspects of hybrid warfare which extend past traditional coercive diplomacy and unconventional war. This article utilizes the term “nonlinear war” in the same way as defined by Russian military doctrine: as a means to reach desired strategic orientation and geopolitical outcomes primarily using non-military approaches.
Making the Grade
Today’s wars will affect the price of gasoline in pipelines, the price of food in supermarkets, and the price of securities on the stock exchange. They will also disrupt the ecological balance and push their way into every one of our homes by way of the television screen
-Alvin Toffler
As previously outlined, the grading process considers the effectiveness of warfare combinations and their ability to reach their intended outcomes. In the case of Ukraine, probable intended outcomes are summarized first, as destabilizing both the region specifically and the European Union as a whole and secondly as preventing NATO military infrastructure near Russian borders, and thirdly as preventing NATO membership expansion. Political ideology involving Eurasianism and dividing the west are also possible objectives. The following assessments are based on how well the Russian Federation conducts various operations in conflicts with regard to four combination categories as outlined in Chinese unrestricted warfare doctrine: supra-national, supra-domain, supra-means and supra-tier.
Supra-national Combinations are a synthesis of national, international and non-state organizations. In the 21st century, global powers must borrow multinational and non-state powers in order to expand their own influence. One of the most recent examples of this combination involves the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and its competition with Ukrainian European integration, which eventually led to the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution. This union operates through supranational and intergovernmental institutions which include a mutual defense alliance. Possible Russian objectives for the EEU involve growth into a powerful, supra-national union of sovereign states analogous to the European Union in order to form a unilaterally beneficial bridge between Europe and Asia. Intermediate competitive objectives may involve enlarging the Customs Union to post soviet states, which could eventually involve breakaway regions of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine whose parent countries have already signed association agreements with the European Union. Ukraine is strategically important because it has the second largest economy of any of the 15 former republics of the Soviet Union.
The EEU is the probable mechanism for waging current and future non-military forms of warfare with regard to international law, finance, economics and resources. This fact is made evident by the recruitment efforts of the EEU on one side, imposition of sanctions, northwestern European defense cooperation, and oil production by Middle Eastern States, on the other.
Another example of the concise application of supra-national combinations is the perceived manipulation of the world’s largest security intergovernmental organization, known as the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). This organization is responsible for monitoring ceasefires in Ukraine, including the Minsk Protocol which collapsed in early 2015, and the ceasefire currently in effect. Historically, the Russian Federation has accused the OSCE of being a tool for Western states to advance specifically western economic and political interests. Recently, allegations have surfaced that the OSCE has a pro-Russian bias, which explains the organization’s failure to monitor the Minsk Protocol and the subsequent ceasefire and subversive combat operations. This view is consistent with the fact that International Warfare’s objectives are to subvert and sabotage the rule of law. Grade: D
Supra-domain Combinations involve employing or merging combinations beyond the domains of the traditional battlefield. Russia’s ability to overlap all domains to include activities in cyberspace to create political and military effects offers a prime example. The combinations that Russia has employed under this model involve: Media and Fabrication, Cultural warfare (defending compatriot diasporas abroad and leveraging historical memory), Psychological warfare, and Network warfare (dominating or subverting media). Additionally,\\
Another example of the concise application of supra-national combinations is the perceived manipulation of the world’s largest security intergovernmental organization, known as the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). This organization is responsible for monitoring ceasefires in Ukraine, including the Minsk Protocol which collapsed in early 2015, and the ceasefire currently in effect. Historically, the Russian Federation has accused the OSCE of being a tool for Western states to advance specifically western economic and political interests. Recently, allegations have surfaced that the OSCE has a pro-Russian bias, which explains the organization’s failure to monitor the Minsk Protocol and the subsequent ceasefire and subversive combat operations. This view is consistent with the fact that International Warfare’s objectives are to subvert and sabotage the rule of law. Grade: D
Supra-domain Combinations involve employing or merging combinations beyond the domains of the traditional battlefield. Russia’s ability to overlap all domains to include activities in cyberspace to create political and military effects offers a prime example. The combinations that Russia has employed under this model involve: Media and Fabrication, Cultural warfare (defending compatriot diasporas abroad and leveraging historical memory), Psychological warfare, and Network warfare (dominating or subverting media). Additionally,\\
Russia has emphasized influence operations in the informational domain to reduce the requirement for military forces, which is exercised through: subversion, disinformation campaigns and false narrative control, English and Russian language propaganda, protests and disruptive “trolling” and Twitter.com activities online. Although disinformation campaigns erode over time, employing a whole of government approach using information operations and attacks in the cyber domain supports the overall nonlinear, destabilization efforts in Ukraine as a key component of this type of new warfare.Grade: A
Supra-means Combinations unite aspects of military and non-military means to reach desired objectives. This category can be directly applied to the initial destabilization of Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea. The Crimea operation was a decisive application of nonlinear warfare for a variety of reasons. It illustrates nonlinear warfare phases involving initial destabilization, deception, information operations and limited military intervention, all with local population support. Supra-means Combinations are also visible in the current conflict in Eastern and Southeastern Ukraine involving pro-Russian conventional, irregular and special operations forces that employ blended tactics supported by a malicious information campaign.
Supra-means Combinations unite aspects of military and non-military means to reach desired objectives. This category can be directly applied to the initial destabilization of Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea. The Crimea operation was a decisive application of nonlinear warfare for a variety of reasons. It illustrates nonlinear warfare phases involving initial destabilization, deception, information operations and limited military intervention, all with local population support. Supra-means Combinations are also visible in the current conflict in Eastern and Southeastern Ukraine involving pro-Russian conventional, irregular and special operations forces that employ blended tactics supported by a malicious information campaign.
This initial assessment alone, however, does not adequately address the applications and compounding effects of the more complex combinations in this category. Combinations of technological, resource and economic aid warfare must also be assessed. The technological assessment focuses on having an advantage that involves superior conventional military equipment and weapons of mass destruction capabilities; Russia currently has both. Conversely, pro-Russian separatists currently do not have full control of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine and Sea of Azov access. Therefore, it is clear that this group is not completely successful in combining militaristic, cultural, resource and economic aid warfare at that level. This particular lack of success in turn affects the same combinations on the supra-national level, but with a different degree of intensity.
These intermediate objectives involving territorial control may be further met through cease-fire agreements giving concession to separatists, or overt deployment of military forces into the Donbas region if recognized as a Russian State.
Conversely, the result may be a sustained de-centralized insurgency or “frozen conflict” with ineffective mission command from Russian military and political actors further destabilizing both countries economically. International military aid and assistance to Ukrainian security forces and internally displaced persons are also possible long term outcomes creating further instability in the region. Operating through the entire depth of the enemy territory is one of the specified objectives included in “Gerasimov Doctrine”, which ultimately results in territorial defense related political objectives. Grade: C
Lastly, Supra-tier Combinations melds all levels of conflict in each campaign. For instance, the Ukraine campaign for Russia melds tactical, strategic and operational levels of conflict in the region. This category’s assessment is based on “beyond-limits” war in Unrestricted Warfare, where both decentralized and man-machine combinations perform multiple functions. These functions span regional ground tactics to international political level effects. Conventional and unconventional operations involving naval fleets, commercial airliners, armed civilians, tanks, air defense and artillery weapons employment, drone operations, abductions, assassinations and electronic warfare are all examples of how, in Eastern Europe, tactics from this category continue to blur the traditional lines of war.
Conversely, the result may be a sustained de-centralized insurgency or “frozen conflict” with ineffective mission command from Russian military and political actors further destabilizing both countries economically. International military aid and assistance to Ukrainian security forces and internally displaced persons are also possible long term outcomes creating further instability in the region. Operating through the entire depth of the enemy territory is one of the specified objectives included in “Gerasimov Doctrine”, which ultimately results in territorial defense related political objectives. Grade: C
Lastly, Supra-tier Combinations melds all levels of conflict in each campaign. For instance, the Ukraine campaign for Russia melds tactical, strategic and operational levels of conflict in the region. This category’s assessment is based on “beyond-limits” war in Unrestricted Warfare, where both decentralized and man-machine combinations perform multiple functions. These functions span regional ground tactics to international political level effects. Conventional and unconventional operations involving naval fleets, commercial airliners, armed civilians, tanks, air defense and artillery weapons employment, drone operations, abductions, assassinations and electronic warfare are all examples of how, in Eastern Europe, tactics from this category continue to blur the traditional lines of war.
Grade: B
Report Card Conclusion
The above grades are a snapshot in time or “academic term”, and undoubtedly fluctuate based on measures taken by domestic and international partners to counter nonlinear war in both Ukraine and in neighboring countries. This assessment is designed to highlight the approaches and combinations employed during nonlinear war, and more importantly, how these tactics are evolving to become more innovative and effective. By no means, does the article downplay the severity of the conflict in Ukraine and loss of life as a result. If Russian doctrine and military modernization programs continue to evolve based on nonlinear war experience and limitation assessments, international actors will be presented with an increasingly unconventional threat in future conflicts. In order to counter nonlinear and unconventional approaches to war, and identify vulnerabilities, one must first understand and assess these approaches to preempt crippling and irreversible political effects.
References
Unrestricted Warfare
Counter Unconventional War White Paper (USASOC)
Munich Security Report 2015
JP 3-26 Counterterrorism
TC 7-100 Hybrid Threat
Victor R. Morris
Victor R. Morris is a civilian contractor at the U.S. Army Europe’s Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Germany. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of JMRC, United States Army Europe, United States European Command, the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, the United States Government or Booz Allen Hamilton.
by Outlaw 09 | January 7, 2017 – 4:50am
In order to understand this below one must fully understand exactly what the former KGB and GDR MfS Stasi mean with the term of “influence operations” WHICH means that there are very very few US grey beard types left alive that fully understand and have experienced that period of the COLD War and understand what and how the Soviet Union and GDR used “influence ops in those days”…so critical in understanding exactly what Russia is now doing.
US intel report: Vladimir Putin “ordered an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the US presidential election”
http://cnn.it/2il3jQj
There are two major German books that would contribute greatly to this debate ….one by a GDR Stasi COL who actually ran the GDR MfS “influence operations Department X” for over 25 years and one written by a former MfS Stasi officer a Major who was recruited and worked for the German BND before he was extracted in a day time op to bring him to the West…AND who led and recruited 25 West German economic espionage agents…9 who were arrested in a single day and another 15 who fled back to the GDR….
The exact same “influence ops TTPs” of the 80s is exactly what we are seeing today just updated due to the IT technology of social media…internet and hacking…..and a 24 hour news cycle coupled with “fake news and fake news sites”….
AFTER more Trump tweets today referencing WLs and Russian hacking being a “witch hunt”…it is important to bring back up comments taken from a 1992 German published book which concerned the GDR Stasi COL who headed the GDR Disinformation Warfare Dept X for over 25 years……
Stasi’s highly secretive “Department X” in charge of active measures [aktive Maßnahmen] was first presented internally in Belzig in 1986
Book in German
Auftrag Irrefuerhung
Wie die Stasi Politik im Westen machte
Publisher Carlson
Auftrag: Irreführung. Wie die Stasi Politik im Westen machte – Amazon.de
https://www.amazon.de/Auftrag-Irreführung-Politik-Westen-machte/dp/3551850038
Fits nicely with the Trump tweets…..
Stasi: “Conspiracy was widely practiced—most widely concerning the existence and responsibilities of the Active Measures Department [X]”
—‘Embarrassment’
—‘corrosion’ [Zersetzung]
—‘incitement’
—‘disruption’
—‘influence’
—‘discrediting’
“even combined into one active measure”
Stasi covert operator: “Active measures directed against [Western] intelligence agencies in Bonn were code-named JUNGLE”
Stasi memoirs: “[KGB] black propaganda used camouflage and deception in order to penetrate deep into the political structures of the West.”
Stasi, 1980s: “Black and white propaganda were not divided by some firewall. They were more like twins: information and disinformation”
Perhaps the most remarkable historical novelty when comparing 1980s Active Measures to the 2010s: this recurring tenet is no longer valid —
MEANING..in the 80s if the active measure was detected they would back off…NOW Russia in fact doubles down more.
A few details on how Russia’s KGB and East Germany’s Stasi cooperated on active measures and covert influence operations
“In the 80s we increased our support for the West German peace movement—at the same time we fought the pacifists in our own country”
Stasi HVA, 1989: “Western intelligence agencies simply didn’t have such a fine-grained disinformation apparatus in Europe.”
“We [Stasi] eventually learned that psychological warfare did not favor peace”
One of the most amazing details from an amazing book: Stasi active measures & disinformation targeted famous Nazi-hunter Simon Wiesenthal
Always amazing what Stasi covert Active Measure operators said about Western journalists—not dissimilar assessments probably going on today
This is what I mean by being now in a true “war”…”a war on the invisible front” common phase during the Cold War used by GDR Stasi….KGB and GRU spies inside the West…..as well as Polish SB and the Czech BtS agents.
Major GDR Stasi operator: “Our ‘battle on the invisible front’—that is inside the West—was unencumbered by moral constraints vis-a-vis the ‘enemy.'”
GDR Stasi: “The disinformation we engaged in far surpassed everything that [Western] intelligence agencies did—in character, extent & intensity”
QUOTE
Stunning section—eg: “Among many journalists prejudices against their own intelligence agencies were predominant—thus facilitating our work”
UNQUOTE
QUOTE
Note that op isn’t over—it simply entered its next phase. Trump is inadvertently prolonging this active measure, making it *more effective*
UNQUOTE
“What would active measures be without the journalist?” asks Stasi’s head of active measures, reflecting on his trade after 25 years in 1986
Stasi: “journalism and intelligence have objectively entered a kind of marriage. Both complement each other and can’t let go of each other.”
“The press, radio, and TV are the ideal battleground for a Stasi operator focused on active measures.”
Stasi memoirs: “Active measures are a Soviet invention that didn’t just imply a ‘war of words,’ but also a specific intelligence structure”
“Often the truth served the lie.”
GDR Stasi active measures operator, 1992
Couple this mindset now with cyber/info warfare….and you have the “war” I am talking about….
Cyberwar for Sale
After a maker of surveillance software was hacked, its leaked documents shed light on a shadowy global industry that has turned email theft into a terrifying — and lucrative — political weapon.
By MATTATHIAS SCHWARTZJAN. 4, 2017
http://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/04/magazine/cyberwar-for-sale.html
BTW…if you have been following me on the Ukrainian thread since Crimea you would have seen me post a tons of comments around this particular Italian software company….Hacking Team….they had a massive hack and millions of Megs of data..emails…sales contracts….actual hacking tools/software viruses and malware software was placed on the common internet…
I downloaded all 800M of their data and am still going through it for my customers especially the hacking tools side of the house and all Microsoft problems they spotted and successfully used when MS did not know they even existed……….they sidestepped EU export regulations when they sold their tools and software…
AND our new incoming President being as smart as he claims he is should have known all of this if he fully understands hacking as he claims he does….
This is from 1986 and from the major GDR Stasi officer mentioned above…..RECOGNIZE anything?????
Stasi, 1986: “For the man on the street it is getting harder to assess [news stories]. This is where we come in as an intelligence agency.”
East Germany’s Stasi created ‘active measures’ Department X after receiving KGB instructions to do so during a visit to Moscow in ~1961
THIS GDR Stasi officer was the master craftsman of his tradecraft….active measures for over 25 years …ie information warfare and disinformation…..
Stasi’s Wagenbreth: “A powerful adversary can be defeated only by carefully and methodically exploiting every crack within its own society”
NOW does everyone fully understand what drives the Russian non linear warfare at it’s core….
1. cyber warfare
2. information warfare including disinformation
AND this is what the former General Flynn and Trump seem to want to fully forget……WHY is that….simply put…both are fully and completely compromised by visits to Moscow and what occurred there…
QUOTED references are in German from the German book…English translation
MISSION: DECEPTION—amazing, eerily topical 1992 book on Stasi active measures in the West, by two former operators, one from “Department X”
Stasi’s highly secretive “Department X” in charge of active measures [aktive Maßnahmen] was first presented internally in Belzig in 1986
Large number of confirming documents reside in the German Federal MfS Stasi Document Center here in Berlin and is open for researchers of that period..
A second book on GDR Stasi Economic Espionage that I highly recommend since I debriefed Stiller in a record timeframe shortly before he departed Berlin as he was being extracted via the BND out of East Berlin to Munich….after his extraction the West German government arrested 9 GDR economic espionage agents and 15 fled back to the GDR….virtually wiping out in a single move the entire GDR Stasi HVA economic espionage department.
He carried out of East Berlin with him over 40,000 microfiche from the Stasi safe of his Department Chief a COL.
Stiller went on to be moved to the US under witness protection until the Wall fell and now he is back in Germany as he had been sentenced to death in absentia by the MfS.
Book:
In the Center of Spying
Werner Stiller
Im Zentrum der Spionage von Werner Stiller (Autor)
Broschiert – August 1994
In German
WITHOUT fully understanding both books one truly cannot understand and appreciate Russian information and cyber warfare as part of their political warfare aimed at the US…..
Actually has not stopped since the 80s when one thinks about it….
The interesting fact in all of this is …and the incoming administration seems..actually no…appears to not believe what Russia conducted was in fact non linear warfare….
While we have seen that the IC concludes Russian hacking occurred and was directed from the level of a Putin…what is not so clear is did in fact the hacking actually change votes..only a thorough analysis of the hacks on the three State databases and comparing paper ballots against digital counts is the only sure way to answer this….
BUT we do know and can prove as very effective information war was being driven as well and that did in fact change votes…..if we take one analysis….from a very good poller….the hammering on the Clinton emails tied to the FBI sudden investigation and the emails being released COST the Clinton campaign a sudden swing of 23-31% and that shortly before the election…
We also have proven that 33% of all proTrump English produced tweets came from a Russian owned Macedonian troll factory….
THIS does not include the massive fake news sites and the magnification of that fake news by alt right and neo conversation blogsites and websites..numbering in the hundreds..
And this by @maxseddon, the first reporter to dive into Russian troll operations in the US
https://www.buzzfeed.com/maxseddon/documents-show-how-russias-troll-army-hit-america?utm_term=.qb26RA29e#.aceO7BNMG
In some aspects information warfare is far more dangerous than hacking as it attempts through a number of varying narrative all previously placed into play via Moscow to change the views of the general public…
QUOTE
1/06/2017 —
WASHINGTON, DC — U.S. Senator Jack Reed (D-RI), the Ranking Member of the Armed Services Committee, issued the following statement today after the release of a declassified intelligence report highlighting Russian hacking and interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election:
“Our elections should be decided by American citizens, not foreign hackers, heads of state, or their propagandists.
This report shows that Russian operatives actively manipulated our presidential election. They left cyber fingerprints and the U.S. intelligence community unanimously concluded that Russia intervened with the intention of undermining Hillary Clinton and helping Donald Trump. The report clearly states: ‘the Russian Government aspired to help President-elect Trump’s election chances when possible by discrediting Secretary Clinton and publicly contrasting her unfavorably to him.’
Regardless, as Senator McCain points out: this was an attack on all Americans because it undermines our democracy.
We know that Russia continues to engage in similar cyber campaigns and we need to take corrective action to put a stop to it.
This declassified report is a start, but it is not enough. The American public has been given a glimpse of a few pieces of a much larger puzzle. They deserve as much information as can be provided without putting our intelligence assets and techniques at risk. And the most effective way to achieve that goal is through an independent, select committee to investigate Russian interference with our election.
There is hard evidence and broad consensus from U.S. intelligence officials on this matter, and there ought to be bipartisan consensus and action from Congress, too.
This is not about embarrassing the President-elect; it’s about protecting our democracy. I realize this may be an uncomfortable situation for President-elect Trump, but the American people and the strength of our democracy should come first.”
At the heart of Russian non linear warfare are the two key cornerstones…cyber and information warfare……and Russia played these two very well during the US campaign and election….
SUPPORTED by the now President elect with his unending number of twitter storms….
Fun fact! The last time the President-elect held a press conference, he encouraged Russia to actively hack Secretary Clinton’s emails MAYBE that is why he holds no more press conferences.
Just a reminder that, if you were paying attention, Trump’s Russia links were perfectly clear last summer
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/how-a-trump-presidency-could-destabilize-europe/2016/07/21/9ec38a20-4f75-11e6-a422-83ab49ed5e6a_story.html?utm_term=.70633ddaa0a6
Also, Trump’s use of Russian narratives has been evident for many months
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/globa
l-opinions/why-is-trump-suddenly-talking-about-world-war-iii/2016/10/28/be44cc0e-9d24-11e6-a0ed-ab0774c1eaa5_story.html?utm_term=.6714df96c8c2
Use of “secret” information plus trolling has been standard Russian tool, used in European elections for years
Anne Applebaum: Russia does its best to elect President Trump
On a scale of one to five with one being the best score..Russia’s one is “winning” right now….
“Given the fact that Russian non-linear warfare is not so much directed at
winning wars but at undermining societies and political systems, Western strategy
should focus more on strengthening the resilience of post-Soviet countries.”
March 2016
file:///C:/Users/575222/Downloads/klein_russiamilitary_feb16_web.pdf
http://www.stratcomcoe.org/online_library
PhD Program
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/10/10/russia-transfers-ukr…
Unrestricted Warfare Author on Geopolitics 2016….
Source: Qiao Liang, “Major General: How Should China Contend Against the US,”China Military Online (in English), 6 January 2016.
To effectively contain the United States, other countries shall think more about how to cut off the capital flow to the US while formulating their strategies because that’s the way to control America’s lifeblood. Why could the 9/11 in 2001 hit the US so hard? Apart from political and mental impact, a much heavier blow was that it drove more than US$300 billion out of the country within a month.
If we connect and analyze all kinds of geopolitical events in this way, we must have a deeper understanding of geopolitics and currency-politics instead of simply emphasizing the importance of the former but ignoring the latter’s decisive influence on the world.
The US is the first financial empire in the world, and will be the last one as far as I’m concerned. There will be no more empire or financial hegemony after the US because the Internet age has arrived, in which currency has become highly electronic and online consumption and remote transaction are driving away paper money.
Then what is China faced with in a world when geopolitics and currency-politics still exist? I think it’s an age when the US dollar, Euro and RMB will all play a part. After that, currency will be replaced by a new model of denomination.
In this process, China should follow the trend and seize opportunities to realize its own interests. From geopolitics to currency-politics and to the current age that we can hardly name yet, only those who can adapt to changes will be the final winner.
History, doctrine, SOF employment, State as a System analysis, propaganda mechanisms, and Effects Based Operations.
http://sprotyv.info/en/news/10597-russian-hybrid-warfare-what-are-effect…
Russian Priorities of Warfare
1. Methodological priority: World view and methodology – changing the worldview and methodology of the individual as a means of warfare method (how a person sees the world) is the most potent from the sustainability point of view. That is why the Russian Orthodox Church and the creation of the “Russian World” as an all-encompassing worldview is of utmost priority for Russia in order to achieve its long-term goals.
2. Chronological priority, the warfare of history – to distort history and chronology in order to justify claims on new territories both for external and internal users as well as to brainwash external and internal victims with propaganda for them to regard Russian claims as legitimate.
3. Priority based on facts and their interpretations: ideology, technology, methodology. The examples: Russian Doctrine, ideology of Russia as Third Rome,AlexandrDugin’s ideology and hisEurasianism,Panslavism based on distorted historical interpretations (see above – 2nd chronololgical priority).
4. Economics priority: eсonomics and finance warfare (example – trade wars against Ukraine, use of the unjustified gas price as an instrument of war against Europe and Ukraine, Russian banking and finance system as warfare tool against Ukraine, currency speculations and throw-in of counterfeit local currency in order to destabilize Ukrainian currency and the Ukrainian monetary system, strategy to buy sovereign debt of victim country and then to request immediate debt re-payment etc.)
5. Ecological priority, “Genetics” warfare (alcohol, tobacco, environmental pollution e.t.c.) – to promote in the victim country a tolerance to abuse of alcohol, narcotics, to support environmental pollution, deliberately destroying the infrastructure and industrial capacities of the victim county e.t.c. In line with this priority Russia is making efforts to destroy the infrastructure of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblast. The terrorists mined the Stirol chemical plant, threatening to cause an environmental catastrophe in the Donetsk Oblast.
6. Military priority: conventional warfare. Military warfare was used by Russia in a new form of an undeclared hybrid war with a wide application of newly created Special Operation Forces (SSO) in combination with use of local residents brainwashed by the ‘higher’ priorities of warfare described above.
As we can see that information and network operation strategies are key and cover 5 priorities of 6 (Methodological priority, Chronological priority, Priority based on facts, Economics priority, Ecological priority) and only one priority is a conventional military priority.
Article was published in Euromaidan Press on November 5th, 2014
Victor,
I found your analysis interesting, but your grading criteria for the Russian doctrine too kind. Russia at best has developed a doctrine that gave them an “initial” edge in Ukraine, but now what? The conflict is looking more and more conventional to me, whether the combatants wear uniforms or not.
Theoretically this doctrine could be employed in other countries bordering Russia that have discontented Russia populations, but where else? I agree it gives them the advantage in the initial phases of the conflict, but then what? And since their hand has been exposed it would be much more difficult to pull this off in the future. To get a grade of C, much less an A, I would need Russian theorists to explain to me what they accomplished beyond inadvertently strengthening NATO, weakening the Russian economy,and making Russia an international pariah state. Hopefully they could provide something beyond increasing their nationalist, which is a sword that cuts both ways. Doctrine in the end should enable military and other forms of power to achieve the state’s policy goals. Is it really doing that?
To me Russia seems to be in a bit of a quagmire in Ukraine. Perhaps this is why they’re sending more conventional military support to Assad? Do they need a perceived win somewhere? I guess a win in this case would be anything that allows them to poke the West in the eye and get away with it? That is a pride win, not a long term interests win. However, we must recognize that pride can be dangerous, and proud men don’t always make what we consider to be rational decisions.
In Europe their new doctrine would probably fail “if” NATO pushed back, which is why it is being executed under a nuclear umbrella to deter NATO from pushing back. So the real risk isn’t their non-linear doctrine, but the risk that non-linear warfare could intentionally or accidentally lead to nuclear warfare. In many respects this form of warfare isn’t all that new, nor has it proven to be overly effective. Little green men without big green men and their armor and their nukes behind them would accomplish little in Europe beyond creating some instability. The advantage Russia enjoys is that the West desires to stay in the gray zone. They’re exploiting what they see as our political weakness, but only time will prove if NATO is weak or wise.
Also it is a bit of a stretch to confuse two Chinese COL’s writing an article on what they called unrestricted warfare as Chinese military doctrine. China may think about these things, but what we know is they’re modernizing their military to include their cyber capabilities. That would indicate that non-linear, unrestricted, and other forms of warfare executed by powerful state actors will still be dependent on credible conventional and nuclear capabilities to deter those targeted from quickly crushing the unconventional aspects of their doctrine.
The third off set strategy seems to be largely focused on high end technology, which will certainly be needed, but we’ll be remiss if it doesn’t address the irregular warfare aspect of war also. Despite claims to the contrary, the last decade of war really didn’t make us better at it. Also we’ll lose whatever skills we did gain if they’re not continued to be taught and practiced. This goes back to what Secretary Gates told DOD, they need to maintain a balanced portfolio of capabilities that isn’t too heavily slanted one way or the other.
www.fotavgeia.blogspot.com
Report Card Conclusion
The above grades are a snapshot in time or “academic term”, and undoubtedly fluctuate based on measures taken by domestic and international partners to counter nonlinear war in both Ukraine and in neighboring countries. This assessment is designed to highlight the approaches and combinations employed during nonlinear war, and more importantly, how these tactics are evolving to become more innovative and effective. By no means, does the article downplay the severity of the conflict in Ukraine and loss of life as a result. If Russian doctrine and military modernization programs continue to evolve based on nonlinear war experience and limitation assessments, international actors will be presented with an increasingly unconventional threat in future conflicts. In order to counter nonlinear and unconventional approaches to war, and identify vulnerabilities, one must first understand and assess these approaches to preempt crippling and irreversible political effects.
References
Unrestricted Warfare
Counter Unconventional War White Paper (USASOC)
Munich Security Report 2015
JP 3-26 Counterterrorism
TC 7-100 Hybrid Threat
Victor R. Morris
Victor R. Morris is a civilian contractor at the U.S. Army Europe’s Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Germany. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of JMRC, United States Army Europe, United States European Command, the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, the United States Government or Booz Allen Hamilton.
by Outlaw 09 | January 7, 2017 – 4:50am
In order to understand this below one must fully understand exactly what the former KGB and GDR MfS Stasi mean with the term of “influence operations” WHICH means that there are very very few US grey beard types left alive that fully understand and have experienced that period of the COLD War and understand what and how the Soviet Union and GDR used “influence ops in those days”…so critical in understanding exactly what Russia is now doing.
US intel report: Vladimir Putin “ordered an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the US presidential election”
http://cnn.it/2il3jQj
There are two major German books that would contribute greatly to this debate ….one by a GDR Stasi COL who actually ran the GDR MfS “influence operations Department X” for over 25 years and one written by a former MfS Stasi officer a Major who was recruited and worked for the German BND before he was extracted in a day time op to bring him to the West…AND who led and recruited 25 West German economic espionage agents…9 who were arrested in a single day and another 15 who fled back to the GDR….
The exact same “influence ops TTPs” of the 80s is exactly what we are seeing today just updated due to the IT technology of social media…internet and hacking…..and a 24 hour news cycle coupled with “fake news and fake news sites”….
AFTER more Trump tweets today referencing WLs and Russian hacking being a “witch hunt”…it is important to bring back up comments taken from a 1992 German published book which concerned the GDR Stasi COL who headed the GDR Disinformation Warfare Dept X for over 25 years……
Stasi’s highly secretive “Department X” in charge of active measures [aktive Maßnahmen] was first presented internally in Belzig in 1986
Book in German
Auftrag Irrefuerhung
Wie die Stasi Politik im Westen machte
Publisher Carlson
Auftrag: Irreführung. Wie die Stasi Politik im Westen machte – Amazon.de
https://www.amazon.de/Auftrag-Irreführung-Politik-Westen-machte/dp/3551850038
Fits nicely with the Trump tweets…..
Stasi: “Conspiracy was widely practiced—most widely concerning the existence and responsibilities of the Active Measures Department [X]”
—‘Embarrassment’
—‘corrosion’ [Zersetzung]
—‘incitement’
—‘disruption’
—‘influence’
—‘discrediting’
“even combined into one active measure”
Stasi covert operator: “Active measures directed against [Western] intelligence agencies in Bonn were code-named JUNGLE”
Stasi memoirs: “[KGB] black propaganda used camouflage and deception in order to penetrate deep into the political structures of the West.”
Stasi, 1980s: “Black and white propaganda were not divided by some firewall. They were more like twins: information and disinformation”
Perhaps the most remarkable historical novelty when comparing 1980s Active Measures to the 2010s: this recurring tenet is no longer valid —
MEANING..in the 80s if the active measure was detected they would back off…NOW Russia in fact doubles down more.
A few details on how Russia’s KGB and East Germany’s Stasi cooperated on active measures and covert influence operations
“In the 80s we increased our support for the West German peace movement—at the same time we fought the pacifists in our own country”
Stasi HVA, 1989: “Western intelligence agencies simply didn’t have such a fine-grained disinformation apparatus in Europe.”
“We [Stasi] eventually learned that psychological warfare did not favor peace”
One of the most amazing details from an amazing book: Stasi active measures & disinformation targeted famous Nazi-hunter Simon Wiesenthal
Always amazing what Stasi covert Active Measure operators said about Western journalists—not dissimilar assessments probably going on today
This is what I mean by being now in a true “war”…”a war on the invisible front” common phase during the Cold War used by GDR Stasi….KGB and GRU spies inside the West…..as well as Polish SB and the Czech BtS agents.
Major GDR Stasi operator: “Our ‘battle on the invisible front’—that is inside the West—was unencumbered by moral constraints vis-a-vis the ‘enemy.'”
GDR Stasi: “The disinformation we engaged in far surpassed everything that [Western] intelligence agencies did—in character, extent & intensity”
QUOTE
Stunning section—eg: “Among many journalists prejudices against their own intelligence agencies were predominant—thus facilitating our work”
UNQUOTE
QUOTE
Note that op isn’t over—it simply entered its next phase. Trump is inadvertently prolonging this active measure, making it *more effective*
UNQUOTE
“What would active measures be without the journalist?” asks Stasi’s head of active measures, reflecting on his trade after 25 years in 1986
Stasi: “journalism and intelligence have objectively entered a kind of marriage. Both complement each other and can’t let go of each other.”
“The press, radio, and TV are the ideal battleground for a Stasi operator focused on active measures.”
Stasi memoirs: “Active measures are a Soviet invention that didn’t just imply a ‘war of words,’ but also a specific intelligence structure”
“Often the truth served the lie.”
GDR Stasi active measures operator, 1992
Couple this mindset now with cyber/info warfare….and you have the “war” I am talking about….
Cyberwar for Sale
After a maker of surveillance software was hacked, its leaked documents shed light on a shadowy global industry that has turned email theft into a terrifying — and lucrative — political weapon.
By MATTATHIAS SCHWARTZJAN. 4, 2017
http://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/04/magazine/cyberwar-for-sale.html
BTW…if you have been following me on the Ukrainian thread since Crimea you would have seen me post a tons of comments around this particular Italian software company….Hacking Team….they had a massive hack and millions of Megs of data..emails…sales contracts….actual hacking tools/software viruses and malware software was placed on the common internet…
I downloaded all 800M of their data and am still going through it for my customers especially the hacking tools side of the house and all Microsoft problems they spotted and successfully used when MS did not know they even existed……….they sidestepped EU export regulations when they sold their tools and software…
AND our new incoming President being as smart as he claims he is should have known all of this if he fully understands hacking as he claims he does….
This is from 1986 and from the major GDR Stasi officer mentioned above…..RECOGNIZE anything?????
Stasi, 1986: “For the man on the street it is getting harder to assess [news stories]. This is where we come in as an intelligence agency.”
East Germany’s Stasi created ‘active measures’ Department X after receiving KGB instructions to do so during a visit to Moscow in ~1961
THIS GDR Stasi officer was the master craftsman of his tradecraft….active measures for over 25 years …ie information warfare and disinformation…..
Stasi’s Wagenbreth: “A powerful adversary can be defeated only by carefully and methodically exploiting every crack within its own society”
NOW does everyone fully understand what drives the Russian non linear warfare at it’s core….
1. cyber warfare
2. information warfare including disinformation
AND this is what the former General Flynn and Trump seem to want to fully forget……WHY is that….simply put…both are fully and completely compromised by visits to Moscow and what occurred there…
QUOTED references are in German from the German book…English translation
MISSION: DECEPTION—amazing, eerily topical 1992 book on Stasi active measures in the West, by two former operators, one from “Department X”
Stasi’s highly secretive “Department X” in charge of active measures [aktive Maßnahmen] was first presented internally in Belzig in 1986
Large number of confirming documents reside in the German Federal MfS Stasi Document Center here in Berlin and is open for researchers of that period..
A second book on GDR Stasi Economic Espionage that I highly recommend since I debriefed Stiller in a record timeframe shortly before he departed Berlin as he was being extracted via the BND out of East Berlin to Munich….after his extraction the West German government arrested 9 GDR economic espionage agents and 15 fled back to the GDR….virtually wiping out in a single move the entire GDR Stasi HVA economic espionage department.
He carried out of East Berlin with him over 40,000 microfiche from the Stasi safe of his Department Chief a COL.
Stiller went on to be moved to the US under witness protection until the Wall fell and now he is back in Germany as he had been sentenced to death in absentia by the MfS.
Book:
In the Center of Spying
Werner Stiller
Im Zentrum der Spionage von Werner Stiller (Autor)
Broschiert – August 1994
In German
WITHOUT fully understanding both books one truly cannot understand and appreciate Russian information and cyber warfare as part of their political warfare aimed at the US…..
Actually has not stopped since the 80s when one thinks about it….
The interesting fact in all of this is …and the incoming administration seems..actually no…appears to not believe what Russia conducted was in fact non linear warfare….
While we have seen that the IC concludes Russian hacking occurred and was directed from the level of a Putin…what is not so clear is did in fact the hacking actually change votes..only a thorough analysis of the hacks on the three State databases and comparing paper ballots against digital counts is the only sure way to answer this….
BUT we do know and can prove as very effective information war was being driven as well and that did in fact change votes…..if we take one analysis….from a very good poller….the hammering on the Clinton emails tied to the FBI sudden investigation and the emails being released COST the Clinton campaign a sudden swing of 23-31% and that shortly before the election…
We also have proven that 33% of all proTrump English produced tweets came from a Russian owned Macedonian troll factory….
THIS does not include the massive fake news sites and the magnification of that fake news by alt right and neo conversation blogsites and websites..numbering in the hundreds..
And this by @maxseddon, the first reporter to dive into Russian troll operations in the US
https://www.buzzfeed.com/maxseddon/documents-show-how-russias-troll-army-hit-america?utm_term=.qb26RA29e#.aceO7BNMG
In some aspects information warfare is far more dangerous than hacking as it attempts through a number of varying narrative all previously placed into play via Moscow to change the views of the general public…
QUOTE
1/06/2017 —
WASHINGTON, DC — U.S. Senator Jack Reed (D-RI), the Ranking Member of the Armed Services Committee, issued the following statement today after the release of a declassified intelligence report highlighting Russian hacking and interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election:
“Our elections should be decided by American citizens, not foreign hackers, heads of state, or their propagandists.
This report shows that Russian operatives actively manipulated our presidential election. They left cyber fingerprints and the U.S. intelligence community unanimously concluded that Russia intervened with the intention of undermining Hillary Clinton and helping Donald Trump. The report clearly states: ‘the Russian Government aspired to help President-elect Trump’s election chances when possible by discrediting Secretary Clinton and publicly contrasting her unfavorably to him.’
Regardless, as Senator McCain points out: this was an attack on all Americans because it undermines our democracy.
We know that Russia continues to engage in similar cyber campaigns and we need to take corrective action to put a stop to it.
This declassified report is a start, but it is not enough. The American public has been given a glimpse of a few pieces of a much larger puzzle. They deserve as much information as can be provided without putting our intelligence assets and techniques at risk. And the most effective way to achieve that goal is through an independent, select committee to investigate Russian interference with our election.
There is hard evidence and broad consensus from U.S. intelligence officials on this matter, and there ought to be bipartisan consensus and action from Congress, too.
This is not about embarrassing the President-elect; it’s about protecting our democracy. I realize this may be an uncomfortable situation for President-elect Trump, but the American people and the strength of our democracy should come first.”
At the heart of Russian non linear warfare are the two key cornerstones…cyber and information warfare……and Russia played these two very well during the US campaign and election….
SUPPORTED by the now President elect with his unending number of twitter storms….
Fun fact! The last time the President-elect held a press conference, he encouraged Russia to actively hack Secretary Clinton’s emails MAYBE that is why he holds no more press conferences.
Just a reminder that, if you were paying attention, Trump’s Russia links were perfectly clear last summer
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/how-a-trump-presidency-could-destabilize-europe/2016/07/21/9ec38a20-4f75-11e6-a422-83ab49ed5e6a_story.html?utm_term=.70633ddaa0a6
Also, Trump’s use of Russian narratives has been evident for many months
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/globa
l-opinions/why-is-trump-suddenly-talking-about-world-war-iii/2016/10/28/be44cc0e-9d24-11e6-a0ed-ab0774c1eaa5_story.html?utm_term=.6714df96c8c2
Use of “secret” information plus trolling has been standard Russian tool, used in European elections for years
Anne Applebaum: Russia does its best to elect President Trump
On a scale of one to five with one being the best score..Russia’s one is “winning” right now….
“Given the fact that Russian non-linear warfare is not so much directed at
winning wars but at undermining societies and political systems, Western strategy
should focus more on strengthening the resilience of post-Soviet countries.”
March 2016
file:///C:/Users/575222/Downloads/klein_russiamilitary_feb16_web.pdf
http://www.stratcomcoe.org/online_library
PhD Program
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/10/10/russia-transfers-ukr…
Unrestricted Warfare Author on Geopolitics 2016….
Source: Qiao Liang, “Major General: How Should China Contend Against the US,”China Military Online (in English), 6 January 2016.
To effectively contain the United States, other countries shall think more about how to cut off the capital flow to the US while formulating their strategies because that’s the way to control America’s lifeblood. Why could the 9/11 in 2001 hit the US so hard? Apart from political and mental impact, a much heavier blow was that it drove more than US$300 billion out of the country within a month.
If we connect and analyze all kinds of geopolitical events in this way, we must have a deeper understanding of geopolitics and currency-politics instead of simply emphasizing the importance of the former but ignoring the latter’s decisive influence on the world.
The US is the first financial empire in the world, and will be the last one as far as I’m concerned. There will be no more empire or financial hegemony after the US because the Internet age has arrived, in which currency has become highly electronic and online consumption and remote transaction are driving away paper money.
Then what is China faced with in a world when geopolitics and currency-politics still exist? I think it’s an age when the US dollar, Euro and RMB will all play a part. After that, currency will be replaced by a new model of denomination.
In this process, China should follow the trend and seize opportunities to realize its own interests. From geopolitics to currency-politics and to the current age that we can hardly name yet, only those who can adapt to changes will be the final winner.
History, doctrine, SOF employment, State as a System analysis, propaganda mechanisms, and Effects Based Operations.
http://sprotyv.info/en/news/10597-russian-hybrid-warfare-what-are-effect…
Russian Priorities of Warfare
1. Methodological priority: World view and methodology – changing the worldview and methodology of the individual as a means of warfare method (how a person sees the world) is the most potent from the sustainability point of view. That is why the Russian Orthodox Church and the creation of the “Russian World” as an all-encompassing worldview is of utmost priority for Russia in order to achieve its long-term goals.
2. Chronological priority, the warfare of history – to distort history and chronology in order to justify claims on new territories both for external and internal users as well as to brainwash external and internal victims with propaganda for them to regard Russian claims as legitimate.
3. Priority based on facts and their interpretations: ideology, technology, methodology. The examples: Russian Doctrine, ideology of Russia as Third Rome,AlexandrDugin’s ideology and hisEurasianism,Panslavism based on distorted historical interpretations (see above – 2nd chronololgical priority).
4. Economics priority: eсonomics and finance warfare (example – trade wars against Ukraine, use of the unjustified gas price as an instrument of war against Europe and Ukraine, Russian banking and finance system as warfare tool against Ukraine, currency speculations and throw-in of counterfeit local currency in order to destabilize Ukrainian currency and the Ukrainian monetary system, strategy to buy sovereign debt of victim country and then to request immediate debt re-payment etc.)
5. Ecological priority, “Genetics” warfare (alcohol, tobacco, environmental pollution e.t.c.) – to promote in the victim country a tolerance to abuse of alcohol, narcotics, to support environmental pollution, deliberately destroying the infrastructure and industrial capacities of the victim county e.t.c. In line with this priority Russia is making efforts to destroy the infrastructure of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblast. The terrorists mined the Stirol chemical plant, threatening to cause an environmental catastrophe in the Donetsk Oblast.
6. Military priority: conventional warfare. Military warfare was used by Russia in a new form of an undeclared hybrid war with a wide application of newly created Special Operation Forces (SSO) in combination with use of local residents brainwashed by the ‘higher’ priorities of warfare described above.
As we can see that information and network operation strategies are key and cover 5 priorities of 6 (Methodological priority, Chronological priority, Priority based on facts, Economics priority, Ecological priority) and only one priority is a conventional military priority.
Article was published in Euromaidan Press on November 5th, 2014
Victor,
I found your analysis interesting, but your grading criteria for the Russian doctrine too kind. Russia at best has developed a doctrine that gave them an “initial” edge in Ukraine, but now what? The conflict is looking more and more conventional to me, whether the combatants wear uniforms or not.
Theoretically this doctrine could be employed in other countries bordering Russia that have discontented Russia populations, but where else? I agree it gives them the advantage in the initial phases of the conflict, but then what? And since their hand has been exposed it would be much more difficult to pull this off in the future. To get a grade of C, much less an A, I would need Russian theorists to explain to me what they accomplished beyond inadvertently strengthening NATO, weakening the Russian economy,and making Russia an international pariah state. Hopefully they could provide something beyond increasing their nationalist, which is a sword that cuts both ways. Doctrine in the end should enable military and other forms of power to achieve the state’s policy goals. Is it really doing that?
To me Russia seems to be in a bit of a quagmire in Ukraine. Perhaps this is why they’re sending more conventional military support to Assad? Do they need a perceived win somewhere? I guess a win in this case would be anything that allows them to poke the West in the eye and get away with it? That is a pride win, not a long term interests win. However, we must recognize that pride can be dangerous, and proud men don’t always make what we consider to be rational decisions.
In Europe their new doctrine would probably fail “if” NATO pushed back, which is why it is being executed under a nuclear umbrella to deter NATO from pushing back. So the real risk isn’t their non-linear doctrine, but the risk that non-linear warfare could intentionally or accidentally lead to nuclear warfare. In many respects this form of warfare isn’t all that new, nor has it proven to be overly effective. Little green men without big green men and their armor and their nukes behind them would accomplish little in Europe beyond creating some instability. The advantage Russia enjoys is that the West desires to stay in the gray zone. They’re exploiting what they see as our political weakness, but only time will prove if NATO is weak or wise.
Also it is a bit of a stretch to confuse two Chinese COL’s writing an article on what they called unrestricted warfare as Chinese military doctrine. China may think about these things, but what we know is they’re modernizing their military to include their cyber capabilities. That would indicate that non-linear, unrestricted, and other forms of warfare executed by powerful state actors will still be dependent on credible conventional and nuclear capabilities to deter those targeted from quickly crushing the unconventional aspects of their doctrine.
The third off set strategy seems to be largely focused on high end technology, which will certainly be needed, but we’ll be remiss if it doesn’t address the irregular warfare aspect of war also. Despite claims to the contrary, the last decade of war really didn’t make us better at it. Also we’ll lose whatever skills we did gain if they’re not continued to be taught and practiced. This goes back to what Secretary Gates told DOD, they need to maintain a balanced portfolio of capabilities that isn’t too heavily slanted one way or the other.
www.fotavgeia.blogspot.com
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