Chronicle of the battles for Ugledar - analysis of Rybar
(https://t.me/rybar)Part 2 - Loss of initiative during the assault on the Ukrainian fortified area
🔺Part 1 — Activating the attack on Ugledar🔺 (https://t.me/rybar/43515)▪️By the end of January, the offensive initiative of the RF Armed Forces had practically come to naught. Due to severe weather conditions, aviation could not operate, and drones could not be used. By February 5, the battles had practically passed into the positional phase. Artillery and aviation of the RF Armed Forces actively fired on the areas of concentration of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which during the offensive of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation lost more than two hundred people killed. The bodies of the dead could not be taken out due to the lack of transport equipment and the active fire impact of the Russian army. The corpses were either simply left or taken to the Yuzhno-Donbass mine, where they were left. To prevent flight from the positions, the nationalists of the Kraken arrived. ▪️In fact, it has become simply impossible to attack only by the forces of the Marines and the OBTF. To tie down the resources of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and cut off supplies, another blow was needed - from Nikolskoye in the direction of the Maryinka - Vugledar highway and the South Donbass mine. ▪️It was at this stage that the introduction of motorized rifle troops into battle to strike at the enemy’s flank with an armored fist was simply inevitable and it was no longer possible to postpone it. However, an adequate military plan was never implemented properly. 🔻What happened? Before any offensive, in order to achieve the assigned tasks, appropriate training is necessary - reconnaissance, artillery and engineering. UAV crews and advanced scouts identify enemy positions, and artillerymen, together with aircraft, fire at strongholds and fortified areas. At the same time, the electronic warfare crews must ensure the complete suppression of communications and drones, and the engineering and sapper troops must carry out mine clearance of the surrounding area - otherwise the offensive is doomed to failure. The delay in the entry into battle of motorized rifle units and the subsequent defeat of the column became possible only because of the general unpreparedness of the infantry involved in this sector. Due to the large-scale mining of approaches, the inadequate use of available electronic warfare equipment, a predictable result was obtained: a rather narrow passage was made in mine-explosive barriers, through which a column of armored vehicles rushed. The entire route was tracked by UAVs and shot through by artillery and anti-tank crews. 🔻 So who is to blame? You can put the blame on the command of the group as much as you like, but in this particular case, the cause of the tragic events was the general unpreparedness of the commanders of the battalion and tactical level, the lack of coordination between the units involved and the disruption of the combat mission. Motorized rifle units were supposed to enter the battle almost simultaneously with the marines, but this did not happen. The commanders of the formations, probably fearing punishment, reported on the complete readiness of their subordinates for the assault, which was far from reality. Due to the lack of elementary cover for electronic warfare and air defense, as well as the objective difficulty of completely clearing all approaches to Ugledar and dachas (well, and insufficient efforts, to be honest), there was simply no other option for movement. The entire column was at a glance from the positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the Ugledar Heights. At the same time, all the equipment was not destroyed, as Ukrainian media say. Some were only damaged, some remained intact. Under favorable conditions, it can be pulled out and repaired. Judging by the open hatches, most of the personnel were successfully evacuated, but there are dead and, alas, they cannot be returned. Fear of command, unwillingness to work on mistakes, failure to use the experience of the NWO year and the most common bureaucracy are the main reasons for what happened. Systemic changes are needed in approaches to the conduct of hostilities - both at the operational-tactical and simply tactical levels. Otherwise, Belogorovka (https://t.me/rybar/32643) and Ugledar will be repeated from time to time.
www.fotavgeia.blogspot.com
🔺Part 1 — Activating the attack on Ugledar🔺 (https://t.me/rybar/43515)▪️By the end of January, the offensive initiative of the RF Armed Forces had practically come to naught. Due to severe weather conditions, aviation could not operate, and drones could not be used. By February 5, the battles had practically passed into the positional phase. Artillery and aviation of the RF Armed Forces actively fired on the areas of concentration of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which during the offensive of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation lost more than two hundred people killed. The bodies of the dead could not be taken out due to the lack of transport equipment and the active fire impact of the Russian army. The corpses were either simply left or taken to the Yuzhno-Donbass mine, where they were left. To prevent flight from the positions, the nationalists of the Kraken arrived. ▪️In fact, it has become simply impossible to attack only by the forces of the Marines and the OBTF. To tie down the resources of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and cut off supplies, another blow was needed - from Nikolskoye in the direction of the Maryinka - Vugledar highway and the South Donbass mine. ▪️It was at this stage that the introduction of motorized rifle troops into battle to strike at the enemy’s flank with an armored fist was simply inevitable and it was no longer possible to postpone it. However, an adequate military plan was never implemented properly. 🔻What happened? Before any offensive, in order to achieve the assigned tasks, appropriate training is necessary - reconnaissance, artillery and engineering. UAV crews and advanced scouts identify enemy positions, and artillerymen, together with aircraft, fire at strongholds and fortified areas. At the same time, the electronic warfare crews must ensure the complete suppression of communications and drones, and the engineering and sapper troops must carry out mine clearance of the surrounding area - otherwise the offensive is doomed to failure. The delay in the entry into battle of motorized rifle units and the subsequent defeat of the column became possible only because of the general unpreparedness of the infantry involved in this sector. Due to the large-scale mining of approaches, the inadequate use of available electronic warfare equipment, a predictable result was obtained: a rather narrow passage was made in mine-explosive barriers, through which a column of armored vehicles rushed. The entire route was tracked by UAVs and shot through by artillery and anti-tank crews. 🔻 So who is to blame? You can put the blame on the command of the group as much as you like, but in this particular case, the cause of the tragic events was the general unpreparedness of the commanders of the battalion and tactical level, the lack of coordination between the units involved and the disruption of the combat mission. Motorized rifle units were supposed to enter the battle almost simultaneously with the marines, but this did not happen. The commanders of the formations, probably fearing punishment, reported on the complete readiness of their subordinates for the assault, which was far from reality. Due to the lack of elementary cover for electronic warfare and air defense, as well as the objective difficulty of completely clearing all approaches to Ugledar and dachas (well, and insufficient efforts, to be honest), there was simply no other option for movement. The entire column was at a glance from the positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the Ugledar Heights. At the same time, all the equipment was not destroyed, as Ukrainian media say. Some were only damaged, some remained intact. Under favorable conditions, it can be pulled out and repaired. Judging by the open hatches, most of the personnel were successfully evacuated, but there are dead and, alas, they cannot be returned. Fear of command, unwillingness to work on mistakes, failure to use the experience of the NWO year and the most common bureaucracy are the main reasons for what happened. Systemic changes are needed in approaches to the conduct of hostilities - both at the operational-tactical and simply tactical levels. Otherwise, Belogorovka (https://t.me/rybar/32643) and Ugledar will be repeated from time to time.
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