Terrorist attack in Crocus in questions and answers: analysis of the Military Chronicle. Part 1.

Terrorist attack in Crocus in questions and answers: analysis of the Military Chronicle. Part 1.

🔺In this analysis we will try to study some of the circumstances of the events of the evening of March 22. In our observations, we will mainly rely on what can be documented: on eyewitness footage that we were able to analyze, as well as on other statements and chains of circumstances.

Reason for attack

Since the role of the Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (and the MI6 intelligence service that oversees it) is becoming more and more obvious, it would be useful to recall a few dates. One of the terrorists, 19-year-old Shamsutdin Faridullin, states during interrogation that he returned to Russia on March 4. It is not yet possible to reliably establish the date of arrival of the remaining members of the group, but most likely they gathered at the end of February - beginning of March. It is also interesting that on March 5, reports appeared that Deputy Secretary of State for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland announced some “surprises” for Russia. She made this statement on the eve of her resignation. And a few days before the terrorist attack (and on the eve of the presidential elections in Russia), the attempt of the State Intelligence Service of Ukraine, with the help of RDK militants, to capture several border villages in the Belgorod and Kursk regions almost completely failed. If we tie these facts together, then the delivery of terrorists and their further use looks like a kind of “safety net” for the GUR in case the main plan fails. (We have already said more than once that the main task of the GUR is media attacks.)

Terrorists: professionals or random perpetrators?

With a high degree of probability, the people from Central Asia who carried out the shooting are neither professional military men nor representatives of any security forces. Once on the territory of Crocus, although they move between rooms, they do so mostly chaotically. It would not be a mistake to say that due to the actions carried out by terrorists, they interfere with each other, cross the line of fire and generally behave like people who do not expect armed resistance and have no experience of real fire contact, when analysis of firing sectors and competent expenditure are of key importance and rapid promotion, distribution of areas of responsibility in the premises and much more.

Militants, on the contrary, make a number of mistakes that literally knock out the law enforcement agencies and especially the army. For example, standing near the metal detectors at the entrance, one of the terrorists shot at people near the door, and the rest, instead of controlling the perimeter, simply looked at the same point. After that, one of the militants ran diagonally across the line of fire.

The militants know how to handle weapons, but primary fire control and control skills can be acquired in a relatively short course of training. It is also curious that during the attack the terrorists did not use walkie-talkies and mainly acted while maintaining visual contact, which is also uncharacteristic of professionals.

Tactics

There are few available videos of the terrorist attack, but they rather suggest that the group does not have any clearly defined tactics. They did not even control the space visually (if they were professionals, one or two shooters would have been assigned to control). However, given their small number, this was not possible on the scale of such a huge complex as Crocus City Hall. Also noteworthy is the use of Molotov cocktails instead of IEDs. Their preparation does not require special skills, unlike an improvised explosive device, during the assembly of which an inexperienced terrorist has a high chance of dying, not to mention the fact that a militant can be “accepted” even at the stage of purchasing explosives.

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